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_ Property Tax Equity:
A Study of Bemidji, Minnesota
L.E. JOHNSON: ROBERT 0. LEY""

ABSTRACT - The paper seeks to evaluate the equity of property tax BSsessment,; in a rural northern
Minnesota area. Criteria of both lll!rtical and horizontal equity were examined in terms of the ability
to pay and benefits measures of the interdecile relationships. In addition, other variables affecting
intra-decile horizontal equity such as age and lakeshore location were considered. The data u_pon
which the results were based were drawn from random sampling of 1000 households in the R-31
school district at Bemidji, Beltrami County, Minnesota. The sample represented 20 percent of all
such households. A total of 216 households responded to a questionnaire which asked for adjusted
gross income. tax assessments, number of children enrolled in R-31 schools, property tax credits, age
ot taxpayers, and whether the property was lakeshore or not. The study concludes that the property
tax assessments in Bemidji violate both vertical and horizontal standards for equity whether measured
in terms of the ability to pay or of benefits. It also appears that intra-decile horizontal equity is violated in terms of lakesh ore versus non-la keshore assessments. Fina I ly, o Ider people in the lower income
deciles are taxed more heavily than average.

The equity of local property tax assessments has long been
of interest to economists and politicians, as well as the general public. This concern stems from a number of sources.
First, this levy has traditional1y represented the major
source of local tax revenue.
Second, it is the most obvious of all taxes, since the
property tax requires large, expJicit, and recurrent payments.
Third, it can no longer be assumed, as it once was,
that real property holdings and income or wealth are proportionally related.
Finally, the equity of the property tax, like all taxes,
is being re-evaluated because of the perceived size of the
overall personal tax burden. In fact many persons believe
that this tax is particularly inequitable, which raises numerous questions concerning the proper place of the property
tax in the overall tax structure.
Though earlier studies addressing this issue suggest some
"rules of thumb" rega1ding property tax equity, this study
waa desirable on a number of counts. There is, for example,
an uncommonly high proportion of retired persons in rural
areas like Bemidji This area is further characterized by a
high proportion of residential lakeshore property. Also,
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Bemidji is the major population center in a county that is
rated the fourth most depressed in the state of Minnesota.
Finally, studies done a decade or more ago may provide a
very misleading picture of current distribution of the tax
burden.
So, if one is concerned with property present-day tax
equity in a specific locale, it would appear prudent to examine
the actual impact of the tax there, rather than to make inferences based on the tax's impact in other times'and places.
Horizontal and Vertical Equity

For a tax to be judged equitable it must satisfy the criteria
of horizontal and vertical equity simultaneously, whereby
"likes" are treated alike and "unlikes" differently.
The difficulty lies in determining .. likeness," for which
there is no objectively correct answer. Two alternative
measures are, however, often employed to establish the likeness or dissimilarity of taxpayers. First, there is the ability
to pay principle, where people with like incomes are counted
as equals for tax purposes. Second, there is the benefits
principle. Here, people are analyzed in· terms of what they
receive from the public budget, and it is asserted that those
who receive equal public benefits are equal for tax purposes
and so should be taxed·-similarly.
To some extent, the concepts of vertical and horizontal
equity are redundant when speaking of a single variable
analysis based on either incomes or benefits. Some say that.
when vertical equity has been achieved, conditions for horizontal equity also have been satisfied, or visa versa. Partially
for this reason, and partially as a reflection of the analyst's
values, most studies of tax equity focus on this type of analysis.
This study continues to emphasize the ability to pay and
benefits measures of vertical and horizontal equity. However,
factors other than income and benefits, when they syste-
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matically and independently influence property tax assessments, may be additional sources of horizontal inequHy.
Therefore, these investigators also examine whether such
sources of horizontal inequity are presently in the Bemidji
assessment pattern.
Ability to Pay and Tax Incidence

The rationale behind the ability to pay principle is that
the tax should impose an equal marginal sacrifice on all taxpayers in subjective tcnns. The general belief that the marginal utility of money diminishes requires unequal tax payments in order to establish equal subjective burdens.
Given those assumptions, and using the average tax rate,
each dollar of tax should be taken from whoever would suffer
the smallest loss of satsfaction as a result. The application of
this rule would minimize the burden of the tax on the community. Its application also would require that taxes he progressive, that is, the percentage of income paid as tax must
rise with the levels of income. Under this ability to pay
principlc, progressivity becomes the measure of both vertical
and horizontal equity.
The Benefits Principle and Tax Incidence

Under the benefits principle, the tax side of the public
budget is linked directly to expenditures, and it is asserted
that the incidence of the tax ought to be such that the
amount people pay should relate to the benefits they receive
from the goods and services provided by government. Linking of costs and benefits is desirable from the economist's
point of view as a means of encouraging an efficient allocation of resources.
General public acceptance of this
measure for equity, however, more commonly Jcpends on
the principle of justice that one should pay for what one
gets.
Other Po:,sible Tax Influences: Implications for Equity

Under either measure of equity just described, if one and
only one variable were to determine tax assessments, horizontal and vertical equity would be satisfied simultaneously.
It is, however, possible for a tax to display vertical and horizontal equity ln terms of this single variable analysis and yet
to display horizontal inequiry because of the influem:es of
some other variable.
One possible source of this type of bias is the age of the
taxpayer_ The re is some concern that older people pay higher
taxes proportionately than do younger taxpayers in similar
circumstances. Similarly, some believe that in northern
Minnesota, owners of lakeshore property pay higher taxes
than do similar owners of non-lakeshorc property. Should
either of these influences be present in the Bemidji assessment pattern, the tax would be horirontally inequitable.
The final task of the study, therefore, is to test for horizontal
inequity on assessments due to the influence of age and/or
lakeshore stat us.
The data on which the results of the survey are based
were drawn from a random sample of 1,000 households in
the Bemidji area and represent approximately 20 percent of
the owner.occupied housing units in the R·3 l school district.
The sampled families were asked to fill out a questionnaire
containing information regarding tax assessments and information relating to our criteria of equity. A total of the 216
households responded. Of these, sevente.i:n· questionnaires
were incomplete an¢ unusable. Responses on four other
questionnaires were inconsistent; the property'tax credit
claimed by these respondents on their state tax retums was
inconsistent with the household incomes and tax assessments
reported. Based on the reported assessments, which were
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FIGURE I: Lorenz Curves for Bemidji, Minnesota;
Before and After Property Tax Assessments_
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among the highest in the sample, the incomes reported by
these respondents were entitled to much larger credits.
Whether the error was in the reported income or reported
assessment, the apparent inconsistency Jed to exclusion of
those responses. The net result was a sample of 195 usable
responses, or 19 .5 percent of the to ta I sample and 90 pe rccn t
of the responses.
A household's reported 1978 adjusted gross income was
used as a measure of ability to pay. Unfortunately, adjusted
gross income excludes the value of transfer payments such as
food stamps and medicaid. As a result, the use of this measure of income may tend to understate the real consumption
ability of tht.1se with low money incomes. It m;i.y thus overstate the dispersion of purchasing power among
households. In spite of such factors, however, it is the
measure most frequently used by applied economists, since
it avoids the very real difficulties involved in assigning
dollar values to those public goods and services provided to
household,; directly.
As a measure of benefits received, the study used the
number of children from a household had enrolled in the
R- 31 school district in 1978. Of course, some households
reporting zero benefits in the present instance have sent
children to school in the past or expect to do so in the future._ One could thus argue that these households receive
some long-run benefits in exchange for their tax payments.
The short-run perspective seems desirable, however, because
of the difficulty in obtaining accurate data regarding benefits
received in other time periods or a standarci for comparing
the value of benefits received at different times.
Respondents were asked to report their tax assessments
rather than assessed valuations in order to allow for the pos•
sible impact of differing tax. rates between townships. If
there are differences in assessment rates that do not reflect
differences in service levels, the multiplicity or jurisdiction
becomes another possible source of horizontal inequity, but
this issue was not address~d in the present study.
Tax. assessments, of course, overstate the actual tax burden borne by households. If actual tax rates are lower than
assessment rates, households are better off in welfare terms
th an the data indicate. However, if tax assessments overstate
actual payments uniformly, the relative rates levied on different households will be unaffected. The major reason for
the difference in actual and assessment rates is that Minne-
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TABLE 1:

(1)
Decile

Tax Assessment:s

(2)

(3)

Mean Assesscentt 1978

Ave~aze Tax Rate

(l)

s

5
6

254.14
617.22,
1415.84
720. 31
319.54
462.15

7
8

522. 45
677 .32

9

483. 76
87 2. 71

1
2

3

4

10

by lnc:,_ome

7.5%
9.4
16.3
6.3

0

(2)

.!_o~l---2._.3~

ID

$66,784. i.2

1580.71
539. 66
4U 72
2]8 79
19,b. i J

15,650.02

2~

3.0
3.0

16

11,939.82
J,820.M
96). 65

3.3

PH Fam(l._y_

~~_!__!_,i_~
2~

1. 9

(4)

())

2.4

-c&

;,&2.00

1.:1:,::

~. A.
262,08

2.2

sota has a Homestead credit whereby the state absorbs a
share of the tax assessments on owncr-0ccupied housing.
Since the c re di t res nlts, in esse nee, to a pro po rt ion a tc re duction in the actual taxes of all homeO\vners. it has the
effect of lowering the actual property tax rates without af"
fecting the rcla ti ve hu rden distribution It is rcla ti ve rather
than absolute rates which are critical to the equity issue.
ln addition to tax assessments, in form a lion also was requested on the property tax credit received by households
against their state income tax liability. This provision, too,
has the effect of somewhat reducing the direct burden of the
tax on property owners. In this case, too, it served as a check
to insure consistency between assessments and incomes.
There was some concern that respondents, misreading the
questionnaire, might report the assessed value of their property rather than the tax assessment. The size of income tax
credit reported, which depends on the property payment
and income, was thus used as a guide in judging whether
the correct piece of information had been reported.
The questionnaire asked for a distinction between lakeshore and rmn-lakeshore property and also asked respondents to place themselves in one of three age categories:
under 30; 30 to 65; and over 65. This information was intended to f1llow testing for alleged horizontal inequities.
Equite Measure According to Ability to Pay

To assess the vertical and horizontal equity under the ability to pay measure, responses were arranged in income
deciles. Mean tax assessments by decile are presented in
Column (2) of Table I. The pattern while not smooth, shows
absolute assessments lowest towards the middle of the distribution, rising at either end. In spite of this overall impres-sion, there are seemingly erratic changes in assessments
moving from one decile to the next. This is not consistent
with an equitable distribution of the tax's burden according
to the ability to pay measure of equity. Even in acknowledging that as a res ult of acceptable assessments errors, it is
unreasonable to expect assessments to increase smoothly with
income, the C-shapcd pattern of assessments observed in
the data cannot be reconciled with this approach to equity.
Column (3) of Table I records the average assessment ratio
for members of the various income groups, and was obtained
by dividing their total assessments by their combined income.
The overall pattern is one of regressivity, assessment rates
tending to be higher at the lower end of the income distribution and lower for the more affluent. This regressivity by
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definition violates the ability to pay principle as we have defined it.
While these deciles are not large enough for valid statistical test of horizontal equity (there are not enough identical incomes to show whether, in general, they pay iJen"
tic al taxes) the degree of vertical inequity is enough to Jis,
qualify the tax as e4uitahle under the ubility to pav
measure.
One of the implications of this pattern may be seen in
Figure 1, which pre sen ts before and after tax Lorenz curves
for the Bemidji area hased on the sample data.
The inner curve shows the distribution of adjusted gross
incomes in Bemidji and it displays a degree of income inequity comparable to that for the nation as a whole. The
outer curve shows what the distrihution looks like when income is measured net of property tax assessments. The
fact that it is further from the line of perfect equality sµggests that the present assessment pattern, to a small but
positive degree, adds to the inequality of after-tax incomes in
the Bemidji area. In terms of the ability to pay principle,
it is not surprising that an inequitable tax contributes to income inequality.
Equity According to the Benefits Principle

That the Bemidji property tax is inequitable according to
the ability to pay does not prove it inequitable in any ultimate sense. It is entirely possible for a tax which is inequitable according to ability to pay to be perfectly equitable horizontally and/or vertically under the bene rits measure. Indeed, some would argue that even if the ability to
pay principle is appropriate at the national level, where distribution al concerns are a major in f1 uence on policy, the
benefits principle is more appropriate for relatively homogeneous local communities where the link between tax payments and public services is more obvious and direct.
Using children from a household enrolled in the public
schools as a measure of benefits received, results are summarized in Table IL In that Table, families arc grouped according to the number of their children enrolled. Dividing this
total by the number of families in the group Column (2),
yields the tax per family in Column (4). The column thus
shows the pattern of tax assessments of different groups of
households ranked according to the educat.ional benefits
they receive. These results must be considered vertically
inequitable according to the benefits criteria. For the case
to be otherwise, tax payments would have to rise when
reading down Column (4) in Table II. Yet, although the
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pattern is irregular, it is a fair generalization that tax payments decline as benefits increase; the exact opposite of an
equitable tax burden under the benefits principle.
The tax is also manifestly inequitable horizontally according to the benefits principle. It is simply not true that
people with the same number of children in school pay similar taxes.
Rather, there is wide variation in assessments
within each benefit group. Individuals in a given benefit
group often pay property taxes approaching the average for
higher and lower benefit groups.
The Possible Influence of Other Variables on Assessments

It appears that neither the ability to pay principle nor
the benefits principle can be used to rationalize the pattern
of tax assessments in Bemidji. As mentioned earlier. however, there is some concern that other factors such as the age
of the tax payer and whether or not the property assessed
is lakeshore, might systematically influence intra-class
assessments. 91ould that happen, the pattern of interclass
assessments might roughly conform to some standard of
vertical equity and yet display horiz.ontal inequity because
some factor, such as age, would influence assessments within
each vertical category, For the tax to be truly equitable,
it must be true that no variables other than income and/or
benefits significantly influence assessments.
Unfortunately, that does not appear to be the case. Con•
sider Table Ill, which reveals average tax payments for lakeshore and non•lakeshure property owners grouped by income
classes. In seven of the eight deciles in which both types of
property appear, lakeshore owners pay higher taxes than do
non-lakeshore owners. The apparent tendency for lakeshore
owners to pay higher taxes means the tax is inequitable under
the ability to pay principle_ The source of this bias is no
doubt the higher average market value (on which assessments
are based) of lakeshore property. There is no basis in econo•
mic theory, however, for consumers with a stronger preference for this type of housing to bear a greater tax burden
than people with the same income and different tastes.
Since lakeshore owners do not on average send more ch.il·
dren to public schools, indeed they send fewer according to
these data, this bias cannot be justified by appeal to the
benefits criteria. Lakeshore property does appear to be more
highly taxed than non•lakeshore, an additional source of in•
equity under both of the accepted measures of tax equity.
Another possible source of horiz.ontal inequity within
classes is the age of the taxpayer. To examine this possi•
bility, taxpayers were assigned to three age groups: those
under 30; those from 30-65; and those over 65. The average
tax payments for the various age groups in each income
TAlll.E Ill:

The Effect of Lalc.eshore Pro2ertr on Tax Asessments
By Income
(1)
}.nc0111e Decile
First

Second
Third

Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
1',mth

16

(2)

(3)

Lalc.eshore

Non-Lalc.eshore

$

341
N.A.
2,594
835
N.A.
56'\

465
733
959
918

r-------·-·······-··

259
726
1,160
682
320

$

AU
543
663
4)2

852

TULE JV:

C~~!

Hean T'41x A.ssessments by Agit: for- ln-cocoe

(l)

(2)

(4)

(JJ
Age Croup

Inc.om Dec:lle

n.-,«

Under JO

S 3)8

Sec.ond
Th:lrd
Fourth
rlft:h
Slxt:h
Sev@nt.h
t::lght:i>

II.,'_
II.,'.

Nin(.h

129

Tenth

JVi
269
'18~

132
J7 l

2.no

s

30-65

,;iy.. , 6~

JJ7
685
l,402
789
36,.

s

]lJ

,,.1

484
521
758

235
761
1,91,
610
182
302
357
4-U
'18
1/.A-

group is shown in Table IV . Overall, age does not appear to
influence the tax burden of members of a given income
class. The youngest group pays the highest tax in four deciles, the middle group pays the highest average tax in four
deciles, and the oldest group is the most heavily taxed in the
two remaining deciles.
By th is simple test, the tax does not a pp ear to discriminate
against older homeowners. A word of caution is in order,
however. Older people in the lower reaches of the income
distribution pattern do tend to he more heavily taxed than
younger taxpayers in the same deciles. Both the second de•
cile and the third show older people paying significantly
larger taxes. Thus, while it cannot be said that the tax dis·
criminates against older people in general, it does appear to
place a disproportionately heavy burden on older homeowners if they happen 10 be less affluent_
Under the benefits principle. older people, none of whom
have children enrolled in school, ought to pay lower taxes.
Indeed they do. The average assessment tax for those over
sixty-five is $432, approximately two-thirds the average
assessment of younger taxpayers, so the older taxpayers as a
group arc treated equitably according to the benefits mea·
sure.
The primary conclusion of this study is that the structure
of the Bemidji property tax, as manifest in assessments pat•
terns, is both vertically and horizontally inequitable accord•
ing to accepted measures of tax equity_ Neither ability to
pay a<i measured by adjusted gross income, nor benefits as
measured by children enrolled in public schools can be used
to explain assessments in the Bemidji area_ This fundamental
inequity is compounded by the fact that assessments also
depend on whether or not the property assessed is lakeshore.
Neither measure of equity can be used to justify such a pattern. Lakesho re ownership, there fore, repr~se nts an additio•
nal source of horiwnta1 inequity. Finally, while it is not
true that older people are uniformly more heavily assessed
than younger people in similar circumstances, it dties appear
that older people in the lower income groups are taxed more
heavily than average. This might be seen as a concern on the
part of anyone who feels that older, low income people, are
already a disadvantaged group.
It should be noted that these inequities are not the result
of failure in tax administration procedures in the Bemidji
area. Rather, the inequities appear inherent in the structure
of the tax. Apparently, the estimated market value of the
real estate owned by taxpayers is not a suitable proxy for
either their income or children in schools. This is not surprising; one would be hard pressed to explain why it should
be otherwise.
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